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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
A DILEMMA
WOLFGANG E. BURHENNE °
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM °
Gasoline containing a lead content of greater than 0.4 grams per
liter shall not be produced or used after January 1, 1972. As of
January 1, 1976, the content of lead in gasoline shall not exceed
0.15 grams per liter.
Benzinbleigesetz of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Gasoline shall be put on the market in the area of the European
Common Market only if the lead content of such gasoline does not
exceed 0.5 grams per liter as of January 1, 1974, and 0.4 grams per
liter as of January 1, 1976.
Proposal Draft Directive of the Commission of the European
Community.
Environmental management, long seen as merely a regional or
national problem, has recently received emphasis as an international
concern. The need for cooperation on the international level has been
felt because (1) disparate national environmental measures can
disrupt patterns of international trade and competition; (2) common
resources such as the oceans and the atmosphere demand common
protective action; (3) activities taking place in one state can have an
adverse effect on persons and property in another state; and (4) the
similarity of the problems in most countries generates a cooperative
search for similar solutions.
Once international cooperative action is accepted as necessary to
manage the environment, the central issues become: (1) how to
develop international normative rules and standards, and (2) how
existing and newly created international organisations can be utilized
to further this process.' Despite the Declaration of the Human
Environment and the Action Program2 concluded by the 1972
*Secretary General (elected), Interparliamentary Working Center, Bonn, Germany.
Executive Governor, International Council of Environmental Law.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. 1972-73 Visiting Professor,
Universitat zu Ko1n, Germany.
1. See generally Rauschning, Umweltschutz als Problem des Volkerrechts, 27 Europa Archiv
567 (1972); Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2 Ecology L.Q. 1
(1972); Angelo, Protection of the Human Environment-First Steps Toward Regional Cooperation
in Europe, 5 Int'l Lawyer 511 (1971); Contini & Sand, Methods to Expedite Environmental
Protection: International Ecostandards, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 37 (1972).
2. UN-A/Conf. 48/CRP 26 (1972).
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United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, interna-
tional norms involving the conservation of shared resources and
regulating national activities are very vague and consist mainly of a
patchwork of rules to safeguard sovereign and economic interests.
Existing international organisations are also largely unsuited to the
task of environmental protection. Their power is typically limited to
the coordination of actions of national states and to the formulation of
recommendations which the participating states are free to disregard.
A hopeful exception to this general pattern is the supra-national
European Community (EC), consisting of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC),3 the European Atomic Energy Community
(EAC)4 and the European Economic Community (EEC).5 These
institutions, functioning through a common institutional framework, 6
exercise a remarkable degree of control over the economic affairs of
the member states, 7 having the power not only to make non-binding
recommendations to member states, but also able to issue directives,
regulations and decisions binding member states, individuals and legal
persons within their jurisdictions. 8 These powers are so different from
those of an ordinary international body that one authority has referred
to the EEC Treaty, the most comprehensive of the three, as a
"Treaty-Constitution." '9 The same point could be made regarding the
fact that the three treaties provide the basis for a unitary Community.
If authority to enact binding norms is a prerequisite for effective
action by an international body to manage the environment, the
European Community should be well suited to the task. In recent
months, however, there has been increasing evidence that the
Community is enmeshed in the dilemma of how to carry out its
principal work of furthering the economic integration of the member
states without hindering the effort to protect and manage the
environment. This article, after discussing the legal authority of the
Community to deal with environmental problems and summarizing
3. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 261 U.N.T.S. 140
[hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter
cited as EAC Treaty].
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
cited as EEC Treaty).
6. The principal institutions are the Commission of the European Communities, the Council
of the European Communities, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.
7. These consisted of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. On
January 1, 1973, Britain, Ireland and Denmark became members.
8. The principal types of legislative acts of the Council of Ministers and the Commission are
defined in Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. For the best and most comprehensive study of the
process of Community Lawmaking, see Stein, Harmonization of European Company Laws-Na-
tional Reform and Transnational Coordination (1971).
9. Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the Margin of the
Costa Case, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 491, 513 (1965).
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EC activity in the held, will explore this dilemma and offer possible
solutions to the impasse.
THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TO DEAL WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
The European Community is an institution designed primarily to
achieve the integration of the economies of the member states. This is
implemented through the establishment of a Community-wide system
of competition which allows each nation's economy to be freely
penetrated by individuals and firms of other member states. The
provisions of the EEC Treaty thus institute freedom of movement of
goods, freedom to supply services across borders, freedom of move-
ment for workers, freedom of movement of capital, and freedom for
individuals and companies to establish businesses throughout the
Commnmity. Restrictive arrangements and the establishment of
monopolies which distort competition are proscribed. National mone-
tary and economic planning are to be coordinated, and social policies
which may affect the fundamental freedoms of the treaty are to be
harmonized. Common Community policies are to be established in
certain economically important areas, such as agriculture, transporta-
tion, energy and commercial relations with third countries.
In view of this emphasis on economic integration and progress, it is
not surprising that the Community treaties contain no express
authority allowing the supra-national institutions to enact rules for
the purpose of environmental management. The framers of the
treaties had no intention of giving the Community powers in this area.
Despite this fact, environmental problems have received increasing
attention on the Community level, and at the Summit Conference in
Paris in October, 1972, the heads of state of the nine member states
for the first time "underlined the importance of a community-wide
environmental policy" and invited the institutions to establish an
action program in this area. 10
There are many provisions in the various treaties which touch on
environmental problems and upon which some Community authority
can be based. The protection of animals and plants can justify
prohibitions and restrictions on the export and import of goods within
the Community." t The supra-national institutions of the Community
also have wide powers over agricultural policy, 12 transport policy, 13
10. Au Sommet A Paris, La Declaration Finale, Le Monde, Octobre 22-23, 1972, at 3.
11. EEC Treaty, Art. 36. The intention of the framers of the treaty was to protect domestic
animals and plants.
12. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at Art. 43.
13. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at Art. 75.
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and social policy, 14 which would appear to allow limited Community
environmental measures to be taken in these areas. Moreover, the
EEC Treaty gives the Community a general power to conclude
agreements with international organisations and third countries, 15
which can extend to the solution of international environmental
problems.
The EAC and ECSC Treaties also touch upon environmental
concerns. The EAC has indirect power to safeguard the people of the
Community against the hazards of radioactive materials.16 The ECSC
Treaty gives the institutions powers over health and safety conditions
in the coal and steel industries, 17 but has nothing to do with
management of the natural environment.
These provisions, however, are clearly insufficient as a basis for
comprehensive environmental action on the Community level. More
general authority is needed. The EEC Treaty contains three far-
reaching grants of law-making power to Community institutions
which can be interpreted as conferring power in the field of
environmental management. First, the improvement of the living
conditions of the peoples of the Community is one of the essential
objectives of the EEC Treaty, 18 and an accelerated raising of the
standard of living in the member states is also a Community task.19 It
is doubtful, however, whether this grant of power can serve as the
basis for comprehensive environmental law-making, since in the
nearly unanimous view of the commentators on the treaty, these
general provisions do not alone provide a basis for Community
legislation.20
A second relevant general category of Community law-making is
the authority granted to the supra-national institutions to engage in
the "approximation" 21 of national laws of member states. Article 100,
the relevant clause of the EEC Treaty, calls for the approximation of
legislative and administrative provisions of member states that
"directly affect the establishment or the operation of the Common
Market." Article 101 gives the Council of Ministers the power, on the
Commission's proposal, to issue directives to remove distortions of
competition caused by differences in national laws, and Article 102
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at Arts. 117-118.
15. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at Art. 228-31.
16. EAC Treaty, supra note 4, at Arts. 30-39.
17. ECSC Treaty, supra note 3, at Art. 55.
18. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at Preamble.
19. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at Art. 2.
20. See H. Ipsen, Europiisches Gemeinschaftsrecht 559-60 (1972).
21. The term "approximation" is used in contradistinction to the term "unification." The
aim is to make national laws more similar, not necessarily to make them uniform.
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creates a procedure for preventing the rise of new distortions caused
by future national legislative proposals. 22
These provisions, however, do not provide a basis for environmen-
tal management. Their primary purpose is to eliminate disparities in
national measures where they constitute obstacles to economic
integration and the free movement of goods, services and economic
units across national frontiers. Environmental management, therefore,
can at best be only incidental to the process of removing distortions of
competition; and it is more likely that use of these provisions will
actually have a negative influence on environmental protection. The
requirement of a unanimous vote for Community directives in this
area,'2 3 will tend to ensure a compromise on the lowest common
denominator of national environmental measures, which will effec-
tively eliminate distortions of competition caused by disparities in
national environmental legislation, but will result in the repeal of the
most stringent and progressive national laws.
A third possible basis of authority for the enactment of Community
environment protection is the gap filling procedure of Article 235 of
the EEC Treaty. This provision provides law-making power where
action by the Community appears necessary to achieve one of the
treaty objectives, and the treaty itself has not provided for the
necessary powers of action. Both of these tests would appear to be
met with regard to the area of environmental protection. Never-
theless, it is doubtful whether such a vague authority can be the basis
for a Community environmental program. Far from being an
implied powers clause similar to American constitutional doctrine,
Article 235 was intended only to supply a basis for filling small
loopholes and gaps in the treaty law-making system. It is to be
applied restrictively and provisionally. 24 To use this article as a basis
for comprehensive Community environmental measures would ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the present interpretation of its role in
Community law. 25
In view of the limitations of the existing provisions of the
Community treaties in the area of environmental management, it
would appear that a clear basis for effective action can only be
provided through amendment of the EEC Treaty. 26 Only in this
22. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, at Arts. 3(h), 100-102.
23. Under Article 100, approximation directives can be issued only by unanimous vote by the
Council of Ministers on which all member states are represented.
24. H. Ipsen, Europdisches Gemeinschaftsrecht supra note 20, at 475-76.
25. In addition, the procedure provided by article 235 does not lend itself to strict controls.
An unanimous vote by the Council of Ministers is required, and the European Parliament,
through which the only input of national legislative bodies would be possible, has only a
consultative role.
26. An amendment procedure is provided by Article 236.
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manner can authority for Community environmental action be
provided which goes beyond concerns for economic distortions. A
limited role for subsidies by national governments to clean up the
environment could be permitted.27 An effective decision-making
process could also be worked out, doing away with the requirement of
unanimous vote by the Council of Ministers and giving the European
Parliament real power to develop legislative norms and controls.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN THE AREA OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Until 1971, environmental management was regarded by the EC as
a matter to be handled on the national level. Although the Commu-
nity had issued two environmental directives in 1970, which dealt
with the control of noise levels and exhaust gases of motor vehicles, 2 8
they were part of the programme to harmonize national laws to
remove distortions of competition; concern for the environment was
not a factor.
The EC institutions first recognized that environmental problems
should be seriously dealt with on the Community level in early 1971,
and this concern resulted in the publication in July, 1971, of the First
Communication of the Commission of the European Community on
the Environmental Protection Policy of the Community.2 9 In this
document the Commission proposed that the Council of the Commu-
nity adopt a comprehensive programme of action to manage the
environment. Articles 2, 100 and 235 of the EEC Treaty were
cited as a basis for Community action. The proposed measures
included provisions for the protection of public health, the establish-
ment of a pollution monitoring network, the coordination of research
programs and the harmonization of national environmental legisla-
tion.30
The Commission received numerous comments on its proposal from
other Community institutions, member states and private groups.
After studying these comments, the Commission published a second
communication on the subject of a Community environmental
27. Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty forbid national subsidies with certain exceptions.
28. Richtlinie des Rates der Europdischen Gemeinschafter zur Angleichung der
Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten fiber den zulissigen Geriiuschpegel und die Auspuffvor-
richtung von Kraftfahrzeugen vom 6. Februar 1970, Amtsblatt der Europiischen Gemeinschaf-
ten Nr. L 42, at 16 (Feb. 23, 1970); Richtlinie des Rates der Europaischen Gemeinschaften zur
Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten fiber die Verunreiningung der Luft
durch Abgase von Kraftfahrzeugmotoren mit Fremdzindung vom 20. Marz 1970, Amtsblatt der
Europdischen Gemeinschaften Nr. L 76, at 1 (April 6, 1970).
29. Kommission der Europdischen Gemeinschaften, Erste Mitteilung der Komomission fiber
die Politik der Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Umweltschutzes, Briissel, 22 Juli 1971, Dok.
SEK (71)2616.
30. Id.
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management program. 31 This included three proposals for specific
decisions to be taken by the Council of Ministers of the Community.
The first proposal would require specific action by the Commission
and the Council of Ministers within a fixed time period. Such action
would include the adoption of water, air and noise criteria, measures
to protect the natural environment and the harmonization of legisla-
tion. 32 The second Commission proposal would have the member
states through their representatives in the Council of Ministers enter
into an agreement which would require them to inform the Commis-
sion of every planned legal or administrative environmental measure
to the extent the common goals or the operation of the common
market would be affected. It would also prevent the member states
from putting any such measure into effect if the Commission, within
five months of receiving notice, were to place a proposal on the same
subject before the Council of Ministers. 33 The third Commission
proposal would have the Council make a recommendation to the
member states who are represented on the International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine. 34 It would urge them to work through
the Commission to define water quality criteria for the Rhine and to
make provision for the private and public expenditures necessary to
achieve the desired standards. 35 At this writing these Commission
proposals are being examined by working groups under the Council of
Ministers of the Community. Despite favorable comment by commit-
tees of the European Parliament 36 and a call for action 37 by the
chiefs of state of the enlarged European Community at the Summit
Conference in Paris on October 19-20, 1972, the negotiations will be
difficult.
The debates that took place at the European Ministerial Confer-
31. Kommission der Europdiischen Gemeinschaften, Mitteihing der Kommission an den Rat
fiber ein Euweltprogramm der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, Brfilssel, 22. Marz 1972, Dok.
SEK (72)666.
32. Entwurf eines Ratsbeschlusses Uber ein Programm zur Verminderung der Umweltbe-
lastung und zum Schutz der natfirlichen Umwelt, Bruissel, 22. Marz 1972, Dok. KOM (72)333.
33. Entwurf eines Abkommens der im Rat vereinigten Regierungsvertreter der Mitgleid-
staaten uber die Unterrichtung der Kommission im Hinblick auf die etwaige Harmonisierung
von Dringlichkeitsmassnahmen im Bereich des Umweltschutzes auf dem gesamten Gebeit der
Gemeinschaft, Briussel, 22. Marz 1972, Dok. KOM (72) 334.
34. Germany, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Switzerland are represented on the
Commission. All except Switzerland are also members of the European Community.
35. Entwurf einer Empfehlung des Rates an die Mitgliedstaaten, die gleichzeitig Unter-
zeichner des Abkommens fiber die Internationale Kommission zum Schutz des Rheins gegen
Verunreinigung sind, Brfissel, 22. Mdrz 1972, KOM (72) 335.
36. Bericht fiber die Mitteilung der Kommission der Europaischen Gemeinschaften an den
Rat fiber ein Umweltschutzprogramm der Europaischen Gemeinschaften nebst Entwfirfen ffir
Massnahmen auf dem Gebiet des Umweltschutzes. Europiisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente
1972-1972, Dok. 74/72 (July 3, 1972).
37. Au Sommet A Paris, La DEclaration Finale, supra note 10.
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ence on the Environment, convened by the Council of Europe from
28 to 30 March, 1973, showed that there is a conflict of interest
between the Council and the European Community in relation to
environmental competence and concerns. Shortly after this Confer-
ence the Bundesrat, the second house of the Federal Republic of
Germany which represents the Linder, issued a well-formulated
position paper on the question of the Community's competence in the
environmental field (Bundesrat Drucksache 120/73 (Beschluss)). It
takes a negative view of the Community's Environment Management
Program referred to above, considering that the Community has no
competence in this field.
THE DILEMMA OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Effective environmental action by the European Community is
impeded by difficulties of legal authority and agreement among
Community institutions and member states. But these are merely
symptoms of a deeper problem. The Community is faced with the
dilemma of how to build a common economic market and eliminate
distortion of competition without undermining environmental
management and protection efforts. The encouragement of measures
to clean up the environment would dictate that the Community
should look with favor upon national legislation furthering this goal.
On the other hand, national standards for products, industrial
processes or environmental quality often have the effect of hindering
trade and distorting competition within the Community. Since this
endangers the functioning of the common market, the Community
sees its role to take action to eliminate differences in national
measures through the process of harmonization of legislation. Because
of the requirement of unanimous agreement among the member states
on the level of the Council of Ministers, there is the tendency that this
process will result in a compromise on the lowest level of environ-
mental protection, thus striking down innovative national action and
causing stagnation of environmental consciousness within the Com-
munity.
There have already been several examples of this process. The
Community directive of March, 1970, regarding auto emission
standards,38 preempted planned legislation in Germany that would
have required stricter standards one year earlier than the Community
standards. Moreover, on the occasion of the passage by Germany of a
law relating to the disposal of used oil (Alt651beseitigungsgesetz), 3 9 the
38. Supra note 28.
39. Gesetz fiber Massnahmen zur Sicherung der Alt6lbeseitigung, (Law Concerning Mea-
sures to Assure the Disposal of Waste Oil) BGB1. 1 1419 (1968). See generally Irwin and
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Commission made known its concern over the possible impact of the
new law on the functioning of the Common Market even though
legislation on the same subject in other member states varied greatly
and was less advanced.
The most serious example of the negative environmental impact
which Community concern for the elimination of obstacles to trade
can have occurred in connection with the recent German law
regulating the content of lead in gasoline (Benzinbleigesetz). 40 This
law, the most advanced among the member states, put into effect a
maximum standard for lead in gasoline of 0.4 g./1. (grams per liter) as
of January 1, 1972. This is to be reduced to a maximum of 0.15 g./1. as
of January 1, 1976.41 The Commission of the European Community
objected to the measure before it was passed using many of the
arguments voiced by industrial lobbies objecting to the law. The
Commission also threatened to bring an action against Germany in
the Court of Justice of the Communities. When this action failed and
Germany enacted the law, the Commission prepared a draft directive
to combat what it saw as a danger to the free movement of goods
within the Community. The draft directive would require a standard
for lead of not more than 0.5 g./1. as of January 1, 1974, and 0.4 g./1.
as of January 1, 1976.42 In an obvious attempt to appease the
Germans, any member state may enforce a standard of 0.4 g./1. as of
January 1, 1974, 43 but the stricter German standard of 0.15 g./1. as of
January 1, 1976 would, however, be completely nullified by the draft
directive.
The inherent inconsistency between the goal of removing hinder-
ences to trade and promoting environmental progress is bound to
remain as long as the European Community's authority is limited to
economic progress and to building an economic union. The Commu-
nity treaties should be amended to give the Community a mandate to
take action to manage the environment. To ensure that environmental
standards and rules will not be compromised on the lowest level, the
requirement of unanimous agreement by the Council of Ministers
should be eliminated.
This alone is not enough, however. Even if directives regarding
Burhenne, A Model Waste Oil Disposal Program in the Federal Republic of Germany, I Ecology
L.Q. 471 (1971).
40. Gesetz zur Verminderung von Luftverunreinigungen durch Bleiverbindungen in Otto-
kraftstoffen ffir Kraftfahrzeugmotorel, BGB1. 1 1234 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Benzin-
bleigesetz].
41. Benzinbleigesetz, supra note 40, at Art. 2.
42. Vorentwurf einer Richtlinie des Rates zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der
Mitgliedstaaten fiber Benzin ffir Motoren mit Freindziindung zum Antrieb von Fahrzeugen.
Commission Dok. III/2051/722-D (undated), Art. 2.
43. Id. at Art. 3.
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environmental management could be issued on majority vote of the
Council, a fundamental problem would remain: the pattern of
Community law-making is similar to and possesses most of the
inadequacies of ordinary international treaty-making. The undemo-
cratic legislative process and institutions of the Community do not
correspond to the far-reaching effect provided for Community
measures. This results in wide-spread distrust of Community actions
and a hesitancy to allow the meaningful use of the legislative power.
Even in a federal state such as Germany controversy exists over
whether to allow the federal government to exercise powers in the
area of the environment that have been traditionally within the
competence of the Linder, 44 and it is even more difficult to believe
that a wide-spread exercise of power by supra-national Community
institutions will be tolerated, at least as long as these institutions are
retained in their present form.
CONCLUSION
The solution to the dilemma of the European Community thus
requires more drastic action than amending the EEC Treaty to give
the Community express authority in this area and removing the
unanimous voting requirement. A community-wide environmental
management program only has a chance of being accepted if, in
addition, the law-making process of the Community is made more
democratic. The European Parliament should be elected through
direct election by the people of the member states. It could be given
the principal authority of passing legislation regarding the environ-
ment, as well as selected other areas, and an administrative body for
environmental management could be created to administer environ-
mental legislation enacted by the Parliament. Even if this were
successful, the task would not be easy, as the difficulty in the United
States of developing national air and water pollution standards attests,
but a solid basis for action would at least be provided.
44. For details fo this controversy see Rupp, Die verfassungsrechtliche Seite des Umwelt-
schutzes, 1971 Juristen-Zeitung 401.
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